| In 1940, I
had just finished my first year in the Faculté des Lettres at
Aix-en-Provence and was 19 years old. I came from a family whose politics
were in the centre, but from the time of the Popular Front in 1936 I
myself had been passionately left-wing although I had not joined any
party. I felt angry about the Munich agreements because France had
repudiated its pact with Czechoslovakia. I had also supported those who
called for intervention in Spain against Franco. The declaration of war
seemed logical to me. But no one wanted to go to war. The people of France
were more afraid of Bolshevism than fascism. So too was the
government.
The Nazi-Soviet pact
deeply shocked me. I found it inexcusable. It was more than a
non-aggression pact: the Germans and Russians made several agreements to
aid each other with petrol and raw materials. The pact caused all the
ambiguities in the French communist party before June 1941.
The Armistice was
inevitable. The whole public wanted it. I was against Pétain from the
start because he was defeatist. But the people of France were to blame.
They wanted him. They followed him blindly. At the time it was said, 'Pétain
is France, France is Pétain'. It was absolutely true. I approved of the
English attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir. I understood why the
English had done it. The French fleet ought to have gone over to the
English side in defiance of the Armistice.
We talked about all
these events in the Faculté. Most students were very shocked by the
events and when the Dean made an obsequious speech in homage to Pétain
there were a lot of shouts from the audience.
No one heard de Gaulle's
appeal of 18 June: it was far too badly jammed. People in Marseille were
fairly content with the situation because there was no occupation. They
talked about nothing else but rationing. The more the Germans took the
more they thanked Pétain for saving what was left. However bad the food
situation was they believed it would have been worse without Pétain.
Their attitude was 'Pétain saves every day'. The word 'resist' was used
right from the beginning. but it meant resisting the system of rationing,
getting round it, finding a bit more food somehow from somewhere.
The communists in the
Faculté were completely blocked by the Nazi-Soviet pact. It's true they
were hostile to Vichy and Pétain but they had nothing to say about the
Germans. They were against the valet but not his master.
To stand out against all
this and to resist by wanting to go on fighting against the Germans was
like being in a foreign country. No one agreed with you and they happily
denounced you. They were obsessed by day-to-day problems of food and any
goods in short supply. If hunger could have caused Resistance, everyone in
the south would have been resisters. there was hunger everywhere, but
very, very few Resisters. In Marseille the hunger was even worse than most
places, but did it produce more resisters? No.
What was done before
1942? Very little. A few students circulated tracts, and demonstrated
against the raising of the colours on the festival days authorized by
Vichy. But there was no really active Resistance until after 1942. I don't
believe that there was anything called 'Resistance ideas' or 'Resistance
opinion'. You either did something or you were one of the mass who
wouldn't do anything. France was Pétainist and attentiste to the
end. If you wanted to do anything you had to mistrust everyone.
The Légion was very
popular and when Pétain visited Marseille the enthusiasm was enormous.
People at first believed that the Germans were protecting them against the
Bolsheviks. And there was a lot of Anglophobia. members of the Légion
made continuous speeches against Russia and against England.
Everyone found ways of
getting bread, more vegetables, more food. But they didn't resist the
Germans. There were a few individuals in Marseille before 1942: a few
small groups of Resisters. That's all. Combat was the first to be
established, but it was mostly a question of discussion and writing
tracts. Very few of those who wrote or read tracts went into active, armed
resistance after 1942. Even after 1942 there was no patriotic upsurge;
that's a myth. There was no national insurrection; that's another myth,
created by the gaullists and the communists for different reasons. real
Resistance was anti-fascist; a small minority, fighting international
Fascism. It was 'gauchiste' before the word was known: independent action
without orders from the top and without a hard political line. This was
the character of the groupes francs in the area after 1942 in which I was
involved. I myself was no patriot, though I was prepared to fight to
defend the Canebière [one
of the main streets in Marseille]. But
I would have fought in the same way in Spain or anywhere else against
fascism. It was an international fight.
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